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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KAY GNEITING; KERRY RICK HUBBLE; 
and WILDERNESS BUILDING SYSTEMS, ] 
INC., a Utah Corporation, 
Third-Party Plaintiffs 
and Appellees ] 
vs. ] 
DENNIS BLAINE VANCE, ] 
Third-Party Defendant ] 
and Appellant. 
> Case No. 950342-CA 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appellant Dennis Vance ("Mr. Vance") submits the following 
Brief in Reply to the Brief Of Appellees Kerry Rick Hubble and 
Wilderness Building Systems, Inc. (collectively, the "Hubble 
Plaintiffs") dated October 18, 1995. 
THE HUBBLE PLAINTIFFS' CHARACTERIZATION OF 
THEIR NOVEMBER 1. 1994 MOTION AS ONE UNDER 
UTAH RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 60(bl IS UNAVAILING 
In the Opposing Brief, the Hubble Plaintiffs are at pains to 
deflect attention from the fact that they filed their "Memorandum 
in Response to Third-Party Defendant Dennis Vance's Motion to Set 
Aside Judgment and Countermotion for Compensatory Damages, 
November 1, 1994, (the "Countermotion"), R. 431-435; see also 
1 
Exhibit "CH to Appellant's Opening Brief, 12 days after entry of 
the final judgment that the Countermotion was crafted to amend. 
For example, in the Opposing Brief's introductory "Statement of 
Relevant Facts, " the Hubble Defendants curiously omit all 
reference to the chronology pertaining to their submission of the 
Countermotion to the District Court, Sfifi Brief of Appellees, 
October 18, 1995, at 2-4. 
The Hubble Plaintiffs ignore the tardy filing of the 
Countermotion for two reasons. First, doing so perpetuates the 
fallacy that the lapse of time between the entry of the October 
20 Judgment and the filing of the Countermotion has no bearing on 
the Countermotion' s legal capacity to amend the Judgment. Second, 
affecting a seeming disinterest in accounting for this passage of 
time strengthens the Hubble Plaintiffs' contention that they 
always intended to have the Countermotion received and evaluated 
by the District Court under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). 
It is worth noting that in their campaign to link the 
Countermotion with Rule 60(b), the Hubble Plaintiffs steer well 
clear of the text of the Countermotion itself. Indeed, the 
Countermotion, the centerpiece of this dispute, is relegated to 
Exhibit C to the Opposing Brief and is never cited by the Hubble 
Plaintiffs. From the Hubble Plaintiffs' perspective at least, 
there is a sound reason for shunning the Countermotion. Nothing 
about that document, not its title, not its text, and not its 
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prayer for relief, even hints at an invocation of Rule 60(b). 
Thus, aside from being most unhelpful in aiding the Hubble 
Plaintiffs1 cause, the Countermotion runs foul of Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 7(b)(1) which obliges a party applying for an 
Order from the trial court to state the grounds for its motion 
"with particularity." 
Though the Countermotion exhibits no ties to Rule 60(b), the 
Hubble Plaintiffs maintain that the evidentiary standards of Rule 
60(b) are applicable to it by default. On this solitary 
procedural point, the Hubble Plaintiffs are only partly correct. 
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has 
explained, a post-judgment motion served within 10 days following 
the entry of a judgment is evaluated under the criteria of Rule 
59(e). U.S. v. Deutschr 981 F.2d 299, 300-01 (7th Cir. 1992); 
accord Van Skiver v. U.S., 952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir. 
1991 ).x On the other hand, a motion submitted more than ten 
days after entry of the Judgment is assessed under the standards 
of Rule 60(b).2 
1
 Federal rules and cases may be used in the interpretation 
of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b). Kunzler v. 
QlDfill, 855 P.2d 270, 273 (Utah App. 1993). 
2
 The application of Rule 59(e) to motions served within ten 
days of judgment is limited to "substantive" judgments, i.e.r those 
that "if granted would result in a substantive alteration in the 
judgment. . . " Deutschr 981 F.2d at 301 n.2; accord Dal ton v. 
First Interstate Bank of Denver, 863 F.2d 702, 703-04 (loth cir. 
1988). 
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The Hubble Plaintiffs maintain that a 'ten-day breakpoint" 
rule, such as that announced in Deutschr settles the question of 
whether the Countermotion was properly heard by the District 
Court. Because the Countermotion was filed twelve days after 
October 20, the Hubble Plaintiffs insist, Rule 60(b) 
automatically confers procedural legitimacy on their ambiguous 
drafting and the only outstanding issue is abuse of judicial 
discretion. Sfifi Brief of Appellees, October 18, 1995, at 8 
(citing Kunzler v. Q'Dellr 855 P.2d 270, 274 (Utah App. 1993)). 
This proposed rule of decision is simplistic and unknown in 
federal or Utah jurisprudence. 
As the Kunzler court correctly observed, the character of a 
post-judgment motion is never determined by reference to the 
motion1 s title. But neither is it established solely by 
reference to a calendar. Whether a post-judgment motion is 
governed by Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) is determined ultimately by 
the function of the motion. U.S. v. Accounts Nos. 3034504504 and 
144-07143r 971 F.2d 974, 987 (3d. Cir. 1992) (Emphasis added.); 
Darrington v. Wade. 812 P.2d 452, 457 (Utah App. 1991) 
(defendant's supplemental statement of objections was the 
functional equivalent of a Rule 60(b) motion). This compre-
hensive rule of construction, though ignored in the Opposing 
Brief, is central to a proper assessment of the character of a 
post-judgment motion. As the U.S. Court of Appeals explained in 
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Peutsch, adoption of the rule urged by the Hubble Plaintiffs in 
this appeal "effectively reads the ten-day time limit out of Rule 
59(e) because untimely 59(e) motions will now be analyzed under 
Rule 60(b) instead of being dismissed, Peutschr 981 F.2d 301. 
But when the purpose of the motion at issue is taken into 
account, the Seventh Circuit Court observed, the ten-day 
breakpoint rule does not immunize untimely Rule 59(e) motions 
from a summary dismissal. 
[S]ubstantive motions served from the 
eleventh day on must be shaped to the 
specific grounds for modification or reversal 
listed in Rule 60(b) — they cannot be 
general pleas for relief. . . Consequently 
Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b) will retain their 
distinct characters, and litigants should not 
expect to employ our rule as a Trojan horse 
for sneaking what are actually tardy Rule 
59(e) motions into the courtroom under the 
guise of Rule 60(b). Nor will our rule 
burden District Judges with agonizing over 
whether a motion asserts grounds for relief 
included in Rule 60(b); it is the movant's 
task to make its contentions clear. 
PeutSCh, 981 F.2d at 301-02; compare U.R.C.P. 7(b)(1). Thus, 
"when a motion can fairly be characterized as one under Rule 
59(e) (i.e.r lacking any special circumstances justifying relief 
under Rule 60(b)) it must be filed within the 10-day period and 
will not be treated under Rule 60(b)(l).,f Reyher v. Champion 
International Corp,r 975 F.2d 483, 488 (8th Cir. 1992) (quoting 7 
James w. Moore, Moorefs Federal Practice 2d ed. V 60-22[3]]). 
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THE FUNCTION OF THE COUNTERMOTION IS FOREIGN TO RULE 60(b). 
The Opposing Brief gives preciously few clues about which of 
the several legal grounds available under Rule 60(b) sustain the 
District Court's consideration of the Countermotion. The 
Opposing Brief's "Summary of Argument" excerpts subsection (1) 
(mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect) and (7) 
(any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment). The "Argument" section of the Opposing Brief sets out 
an extended quotation from Rees v. Albertonsf Inc.r 587 P.2d 130, 
131-32 (Utah 1978), for the proposition that a trial court may 
correct any order entered by mistake, inadvertence, surprise or 
excusable neglect. The difficulty in analyzing the argument of 
the Opposing Brief is that even considering these fleeting 
references to Rules 60(b)(1) and 60(b)(7), it contains absolutely 
no application of any subsection of Rule 60fb) to the facts of 
this case. SfiB Brief of Appellees at 6-14. As a result, as this 
Court analyzes the Opposing Brief, it is put in the same 
unfortunate position as the District Court on November 1, 1994, 
upon receipt of the Countermotion. In both circumstances, the 
reviewing court is forced to agonize over the proper application 
of procedural rules in response to the Hubble Plaintiffs' vague 
call for relief from the October 20 Judgment. But at least in 
these proceedings, the reviewing court may bypass that fulsome 
task by observing that the function of the Countermotion was to 
6 
amend the October 20 Judgment and its corresponding findings of 
fact and conclusions of law and therefore has no relation to Rule 
60(b), 
The Hubble Plaintiffs argue, correctly, that Rule 60(b) is 
to be liberally construed. Brief of Appellees at 9; &££ Kunzler 
v. O'DQII, 855 P.2d 270, 273 (Utah App. 1993). Nonetheless, 
relief under Rule 60(b) is discretionary with the trial court and 
may be granted only if the movant demonstrates exceptional 
circumstances "by satisfying one or more of Rule 60(b)fs seven 
grounds for relief from judgment. Van Skiver v. U.S., 952 F.2d 
1241, 1244 (10th Cir. 1991). Assuming the Hubble Plaintiffs 
intend to invoke Rule 60(b)(1), they must be prepared to show by 
reference to the record in this case that the District Court's 
award of no compensatory damages against Mr. Vance was a 
consequence of mistake or inadvertence. But the record simply 
will not allow the Hubble Plaintiffs to demonstrate that point. 
As the transcript of the August 18, 1994, proceedings before the 
Honorable Homer Wilkinson make clear, the District Court's award 
of only punitive damages against Mr. Vance was a deliberate 
(though voidable) ruling. At that point in the August 18 
proceedings, the following exchange occurred between the 
Honorable Homer Wilkinson and Mr. Vance: 
THE COURT: Mr. Vance, any questions sir, 
MR. VANCE: There's no compensatory damages. 
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There's punitive damages against me from the 
Third Party Plaintiff; is that correct? 
THE COURT: Yes, punitive damages, only. 
MR. VANCE: Okay, I understand. 
Transcript, Telephone Conference, August 18, 1994, at 7 (R. 362). 
Where the Hubble Plaintiffs find either mistake or inadvertence 
lodged in this dialogue is unfathomable. 
Beyond showing that the District Court did not act out of 
mistake or inadvertence within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(1), this 
transcript excerpt demonstrates that the error of which the 
Hubble Plaintiffs complained in the Countermotion, is not one 
that may be corrected under Rule 60(b)(1). After all, M"mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect' does not include 
errors of law.M Elias v. Ford Motor Co., 734 F.2d 463, 467 (1st 
Cir. 1984); McNight v. United Stated Steel Corp.. 726 F.2d 333, 
338 (7th Cir. 1984) (Rule 60(b) is not intended to correct errors 
of law made by the District Court in the underlying decision 
which resulted in a final judgment). 
The Hubble Plaintiffs' alternate recourse to Rule 60(b)(7) 
yields the same result. While generally Rule 60(b) is construed 
liberally, that is not the case with respect to subsection 
60(b)(7). One resorting to subsection (7) first must demonstrate 
that its claim for relief from the judgment is not more 
appropriately addressed to the six alternative legal grounds 
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available under subsections (l)-(6). 7 James W. Moore, Moorefs 
Federal Practice f 60.27[1] at 60-266 (2d ed. 1992) (citing 
cases). But here, neither the Countermotion nor the Opposing 
Brief takes the trouble to make any such showing. As noted 
above, the Brief of Appellees mounts absolutely no argument tying 
any subsection of Rule 60(b) to the facts of this case. In 
addition, the Opposing Brief makes no effort to point up the 
unavailability of relief under subsections 60(b)(1) through 
60(b)(6). Indeed, as explained above, the Opposing Brief 
appears to embrace Rule 60(b)(1). In any event, the Hubble 
Plaintiffs may not couch their request for relief under Rule 
60(b)(7), the "grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice 
in a particular case." Van Skiver, 952 F.2d at 1244. Rule 
60(b)(7) may be invoked only in exceptional and compelling 
circumstances, and may not be used as a substitute for appeal. 
Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193 (1950); MoorefS Federal 
Practice if 60.27[1] at 269. Thus where a party attempts to 
secure relief under that subsection it must state clearly why 
relief is unavailable under the alternate grounds available under 
Rule 60(b) and, in addition, why a correction of legal error by 
appeal was not available. Moore's Federal Practice at 60-270 to 
271. 
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THE HUBBLE PLAINTIFFS WERE OBLIGED TO SEEK RELIEF 
FROM THE OCTOBER 20 JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 59(e) 
The "best evidence" of which procedural rule must govern 
consideration of the Countermotion is found in the text of the 
Countermotion. That document, four pages in length, is a summary 
recital of proceedings before the District Court on June 1, 1994. 
The Countermotion reviews and vouches for the evidence the Hubble 
Plaintiffs mounted against Mr. Vance on June 1 and thereafter 
asks the Court to enter a different judgment based upon that 
evidence. Because the function of the Countermotion was to 
revisit the Hubble Plaintiffs' claims for relief and supporting 
evidence, and, in addition, to suggest that the ruling on those 
claims in evidence was legal error, the Countermotion must be 
brought under Rule 59(e). In Van Skiver v. U.S.r 952 F.2d 1241 
(10th Cir. 1991), the plaintiff/appellants appealed from the 
District Court's Order denying their "Motion to Reconsider" the 
Court's judgment against them. The Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals noted that the plaintiffs failed to classify their motion 
as one under either Rule 59(e) or under 60(b) and further 
observed that the plaintiff's motion was not served within ten 
days of the District Court's Judgment. Van Skiver, 952 F.2d at 
1243. 
In affirming the District Court's denial of the plaintiff's 
motion the Tenth Circuit Court declared that the plaintiffs had 
10 
failed to demonstrate any bases for Rule 60(b) relief. Id. That 
court explained the legal bases for its ruling: 
Plaintiffs' motion did not recite any of the 
exceptional circumstances warranting relief 
under Rule 60(b), nor does our reading of the 
record disclose any. In essence, plaintiffs' 
motion reiterated the original issues raised 
in their complaint and sought to challenge 
the legal correctness of the District Court's 
Judgment by arguing that the District Court 
misapplied the law or misunderstood their 
position. Such arguments are properly 
brought under Rule 59(e) within ten days of 
the District Court's judgment or on direct 
appeal but do not justify relief from the 
District Court's Judgment pursuant to Rule 
60(b). 
Van Skiver, 952 F.2d at 1244. 
The Hubble Plaintiffs, both through their Countermotion and 
again in their Opposing Brief, are on the same tack as the 
plaintiffs in Van Skiver. They submitted an ambiguous Motion for 
Reconsideration and sought to reargue their case to the District 
Court through the vehicle of the Motion. Just as the Appellate 
Court in Van Skiver determined that Rule 59(e) governed such a 
motion, this Court must declare the same result as well. Given 
the relief sought by the Hubble Plaintiffs, their only recourse 
for post-judgment reconsideration was through Rule 59(e). They 
failed to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of that rule 
that such a motion be filed within ten days of entry of final 
judgment. They failed to meet that deadline and as a result, 
"the District Court [lost] jurisdiction over that motion and any 
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ruling on it becomes a nullity." Reyher v» Champion International 
C Q U L W 975 F.2d 483, 489 (8th Cir. 1992). 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S CONSIDERATION OF THE 
COUNTERMOTION IS NOT A MATTER VESTED IN 
THE DISCRETION OF THAT COURT 
The Hubble Plaintiffs argue that a District Court's 
consideration of a Rule 60(b) motion is discretionary and that 
Court's ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of 
discretion. £g& Brief of Appellees at 9. This legal analysis 
simply begs the question. The principal issue before this Court 
is which procedural guideline, either Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b), 
governs the District Court's consideration of the Countermotion. 
The fact that the District Court elected to rule on the 
Countermotion is squarely before this Court; how the District 
Court ruled on the Countermotion is not. Accordingly, this Court 
may dismiss this aspect of the Hubble Plaintiffs' argument out of 
hand. 
CONCLUSION 
In the proceeding Brief, Mr. Vance has shown that there is 
no legal basis available to the Hubble Plaintiffs for maintaining 
the Countermotion under Rule 60(b). Given the type of relief 
that the Hubble Plaintiffs were seeking through the 
Countermotion, they were obligated to observe the strictures of 
Rule 59(e). Given the function of the Countermotion, Rule 60(b) 
simply has no application in this case. 
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When the District Court considered the late-filed 
Countermotion, it acted beyond its jurisdiction. Its ruling on 
that motion is therefore a nullity and of no legal effect on Mr. 
Vance. Though typically an Appellate Court does not visit the 
merits of the judgment underlying a post-judgment motion, in this 
case it must. As Mr. Vance pointed out in his Opening Brief, the 
District Court's October 20 Judgment is one for punitive damages 
only. Such a result is contrary to established Utah law. The 
analysis on this point is simply this: the District Court 
determined that Mr. Vance inflicted no injury on the Hubble 
Plaintiffs for which compensatory damages were warranted. In 
other words, the Hubble Plaintiffs failed to make out their cause 
of action against Mr. Vance. If there is no culpable conduct, 
let alone conduct that evidences a conscious disregard for the 
rights of the Hubble Plaintiffs, there may be no award of 
punitive damages. This Court must either vacate the award of 
punitive damages against Mr. Vance or in the alternative direct 
the District Court to conduct new trial proceedings and enter a 
lawful ruling against iVit. Vance. 
DATED this If' clay of November, 1995. 
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Tab A 
Rule 60 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 178 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other 
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may 
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pen-
dency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evi-
dence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence coujd not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrin-
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has 
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has 
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to enter-
tain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or pro-
ceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these 
rules or by an independent action. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 60, F.R.C.P. 
ANALY8I8 
"Any other reason justifying relief." 
—Default judgment. 
—Impossibility of compliance with order. 
—Incompetent counsel. 
—Lack of due process. 
—Merits of case. 
—Mistake or inadvertence. 
—Mutual mistake. 
—Real party in interest. 
—Refund of fine after dismissal. 
Appeals. 
Clerical mistakes. 
—Computation of damages. 
—Correction after appeal. 
—Date of judgment. 
Void judgment. 
—Estate record. 
—Inherent power of courts. 
—Intent of court and parties. 
—Judicial error distinguished. 
—Order prepared by counsel. 
—Predating of new trial motion. 
Court's discretion. 
Default judgment. 
Effect of set-aside judgment. 
—Admissions. 
Form of motion. 
Fraud. 
—Burden of proof. 
—Divorce action. 
Independent action. 
—Constitutionality of taxes. 
—Divorce decree. 
—Fraud or duress. 
—Motion distinguished. 
Invalid summons. 
—Amendment without notice. 
Inequity of prospective application. 
Jurisdiction. 
Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable 
neglect 
—Default judgment. 
Illness. 
Inconvenience. 
Meritorious. 
Merits of claim. 
Negligence of attorney. 
No claim for relief. 
—Delayed motion for new trial. 
—Factual error. 
—Failure to file cost bill. 
—Failure to file notice of appeal. 
—Nonreceipt of notice and findings. 
